Abstract. We define a fragment of monadic infinitary second-order logic corresponding to a kind of abstract separation property. We use this to define certain subclasses of elementary classes as separation subclasses. We use model theoretic techniques and games to show that separation subclasses which are, in a sense, recursively enumerable in our second-order fragment can also be recursively axiomatized in their original first-order language. We pin down the expressive power of this formalism with respect to first-order logic, and investigate some questions relating to decidability and computational complexity. As applications, we use simple characterizations as separation subclasses to obtain axiomatizability results related to graph colourings and partial algebras.
Introduction
We begin with a motivating example. Precise definitions will be given in the next section. A partially ordered set (poset) is representable if it can be embedded into a powerset algebra via a map that preserves existing finite meets and joins. The class of representable posets (RP) and its infinitary variations have been studied, not always using this terminology, in [8, 28, 20, 38, 11, 13, 12, 14, 15] , generalizing work done in the setting of semilattices [2, 32, 9, 26] , and for distributive lattices and Boolean algebras [3, 35, 30, 34, 4, 6, 7, 1, 16] . At first glance, it is far from obvious that RP is an elementary class. However, it is fairly easy to show that a poset is representable if and only if it has a 'separating' set of 'prime filters'. More precisely, a poset P is representable if and only if whenever p ≤ q ∈ P there is a 'prime filter' of P containing p and not q. Note that there a several non-equivalent concepts of 'prime filter of a poset' in circulation, and we are using one in particular. A more precise definition is given in Example 2.4. Now, given the description of RP in terms of this 'separation property', it is possible to show that it can in fact be axiomatized in first-order logic, by an argument appealing to the Keisler-Shelah Theorem [27, 33] . That such an axiomatization exists is proved as [11, Theorem 4.5] , but no explicit axiomatization is given. Such a non-constructive proof of existence may be regarded as being of limited practical use, however, the very fact that an axiomatization is known to exist can be used in a neat trick to show that a certain constructively generated axiomatization is 'correct'. This is the main result of [15] .
The method of [15] , which is not novel, is to describe the 'separation property' of representable posets in terms of a game played between two players. The game is defined so that the number of rounds a certain player can survive in a particular game corresponds, in a sense, to how close a given poset is to being representable. First-order axioms are then written down that correspond to the player 'having a strategy' in a game. These axioms are shown to correctly axiomatize RP, by means of the 'neat trick' mentioned previously.
A similar idea appears in [23] , where it is used to find an explicit axiomatization for a certain class of partial algebras of partial functions that appears in connection with separation logic. Again we have a class which is not obviously elementary, but which can fairly easily be shown to be definable in terms of a 'separation property'. The separation property is then used to show, non-constructively, that a first-order axiomatization exists, and then to construct explicit axioms based on games which are, using the 'neat trick', shown to be a 'correct' axiomatization for the class.
The main purpose of this paper is to prove a general theorem that includes the relevant results of [23, 15] as special cases, and is also applicable in a wide variety of other situations. The strategy is to first formalize the concept of a 'separation property' in a way that allows the necessary results to go through, while also being intuitive enough to be useful in practice. This is done in Section 2. In particular, the basic definition of a separation subclass is made. The sense in which separation subclasses can be, for example, countable, or recursively enumerable, is also explained.
We formalize the concept of a separation subclass using a kind of infinitary monadic second-order logic. We show that if A is a class of structures and B is a subclass of A that is elementary relative to A, then B can always be described as separation subclass of A (Corollary 2.8). More interestingly, we show that every separation subclass of an elementary class has a first-order axiomatization relative to the superclass (Theorem 2.15). Thus separation subclasses and elementary subclasses are, in a sense, the same thing. However, the important difference is that descriptions as separation subclasses can often be much easier to find than elementary axiomatizations. Moreover, as we shall see, provided the superclass is elementary, we can use a description of a subclass as a recursively enumerable separation subclass to automate the construction of explicit first-order axiomatizations.
In Section 3 we describe a class of games played between two players, ∀ and ∃. The key result is that, if B is a countable separation subclass of A, then given A ∈ B, the player ∃ has a strategy for never losing in every relevant game. Conversely, if A ∈ A is countable, then ∃ having such strategies implies that A ∈ B (Proposition 3.1).
Section 4 formalizes the existence of strategies for ∃ in first-order logic. The main result, which is stated as Corollary 4.6, is that a recursively enumerable separation subclass B of an elementary class A always has a recursive first-order axiomatization relative to A, which we can generate systematically by examining the relevant class of games. Moreover, we present simple sufficient conditions for the axiomatization produced to be universal.
In Section 5 we collect together some previous results to make explicit the connections between the various kinds of separation subclasses and the various ways a class can be elementary relative to its superclass (Proposition 5.2). We also make some simple observations regarding decision problems and complexity (Propositions 5.4 and 5.6).
Finally, in Section 6 we present some applications of the general theory we have developed. First we show how the work in [23] on disjoint union partial algebras fits into the framework of separation subclasses, and how this automatically proves some of the results of that paper (Section 6.1). Following this we consider graph colourings. In particular, in Section 6.2, from the fact that the class of N -colourable graphs has a simple description as a separation subclass of the class of all graphs, we are able to find easy proofs of several model theoretic results relating to these structures. We present new proofs of the known results that, for all N ≥ 2, the class of N -colourable graphs has a universal Horn axiomatization, but is not finitely axiomatizable, and also that, when N ≥ 3, the class of graphs with characteristic number N is not elementary. We stress that there is nothing particularly impressive about these new proofs in themselves. Indeed, the important point is that they follow so easily from the general results on separation subclasses. In this sense, N -colourable graphs provide a good example of a class where a characterization as a separation subclass is obvious, but where results relating to first-order axiomatizability are perhaps not so obvious.
In Sections 6.3 and 6.4 we describe the classes of graphs with N -clique covers, and harmonious N -colourings, respectively, as separation subclasses. Thus, as an immediate consequence, we can show that both classes have recursive universal axiomatizations relative to the class of all graphs. Moreover, our method proves that the class of graphs with harmonious N -colourings is actually finitely axiomatizable.
Separation subclasses
We adopt the convention that indexing sets are denoted by capital letters, and arbitrary indices taken from these sets use the corresponding lowercase letters. Also, if we declare a set {x 1 , . . . , x N }, we will use x n to denote arbitrary elements from this set. We will use e.g. x N to denote the tuple (x 1 , . . . , x N ). If X is a set we may abuse notation slightly by writing X ∪ x N to denote X ∪ {x 1 , . . . , x N }. Definition 2.1. Let L be a first-order signature, and let C 1 , . . . , C K be unary predicate symbols not appearing in
where γ is a first-order L -formula with free variables y 1 , . . . , y M , and ψ is a quantifier-free first-order L + -formula with the same free variables. Note that I may be infinite.
Definition 2.2.
A separation rule of positive order for L is a monadic secondorder sentence of form
where µ is an L -formula with free variables x N , where η is a quantifier-free L + -formula with the same free variables, and where τ is either a C K -closure rule or the tautology ⊤.
So, in the case where τ = ⊤, a separation rule of positive order has form
for some set I (which may be infinite). A separation rule of order zero for L is just an L -sentence with a leading universal quantifier. Separation rules of positive and zero order are known collectively as separation rules.
The order of a separation rule of positive order is the value of K used in its definition. The order of a separation rule of order zero is 0 (unsurprisingly).
A set Σ of separation rules is called a separation scheme. A separation scheme is recursively enumerable (r.e.) if Σ is recursively enumerable, and for each σ ∈ Σ, the set of sentences making up the conjunction τ σ is also recursively enumerable. Recursive, countable and basic separation schemes are defined similarly by replacing the 'recursively enumerable' with 'recursive, 'countable' and 'finite' respectively. Definition 2.3 (Σ + ). If Σ is a separation schema, we use Σ + to denote the subset of Σ containing all the separation rules of positive order.
We note that calling B, for example, a 'countable separation subclass' is ambiguous. Is B a countable class that is also a separation subclass, or is B a countable separation subclass in the sense of Definition 2.2? This should generally be clear from context, but for the sake of clarity, we remark that in all situations in this paper we mean the latter, and the same goes for r.e. separation subclasses etc. 
and for each 1 ≤ i < ω define
, and
Then σ is a separation rule. A partially ordered set P that satisfies σ has the property that whenever p ≤ q ∈ P there is an up-closed set Γ containing p but not q, and such that Γ is closed under finite meets, and also has the property that if the join of a finite set X is in Γ, then X ∩ Γ = ∅. We will refer to a subset Γ of a poset satisfying these closure properties as an ω-filter. Definition 2.5. Let L be a first-order signature, let A be a class of L -structures, and let B be a subclass of A. Then B is a separation subclass of A if there is a separation scheme Σ such that B = {A ∈ A : A |= Σ}. Here |= is defined using the standard semantics for second-order logic. A separation subclass is r.e./recursive/countable/basic when it can be defined using a separation scheme with the corresponding property. If A is the class of all L -structures then we say B is a separation class. Example 2.6. We say a poset is P is representable if there is a set X and an order embedding h : P → ℘(X) such that h preserves finite meets and joins from P whenever they exist (here ℘(X) is considered as a lattice with operations ∪ and ∩). It is easy to prove that a poset P is representable if and only if whenever p ≤ q ∈ P there is an ω-filter of P containing p and not q (see, for example, [15 Generalizing, given any 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω we say a poset P is (α, β)-representable if there is a set X and an order embedding h : P → ℘(X) such that h preserves meets of cardinality strictly less than α, and joins of cardinality strictly less than β. Adapting the previous argument we can show the class of (α, β)-representable posets is an r.e. separation subclass of the class of all posets, and is basic when α, β < ω.
As may be expected given the second-order component, the machinery of separation subclasses is not weaker than the machinery of first-order logic when it comes to specifying subclasses of classes of L -structures. We make this precise in the following lemma and its corollary. Somewhat more surprisingly, it turns out that is not stronger either. This is the result of Theorem 2.15.
Lemma 2.7. Let L be a first-order signature, and let φ be an L -sentence. Then there is a separation rule σ φ such that, for all L -structures A we have
Proof. Let x be a variable symbol of L not appearing in φ, let C be a unary predicate symbol not appearing in L , and let ⊤ x = x ≈ x. Define
Then σ φ is a separation rule of order zero, and also is obviously logically equivalent to φ. Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.7 and Definition 2.5.
It will be useful to slightly generalize the familiar notion of a pseudoelementary class. Proof. Let A be a class of L -structures, let Σ be a separation scheme defining B relative to A, and let σ ∈ Σ have order K for some K > 0 (as there is nothing to do in the case where K = 0). So
where we either have τ σ = ⊤ or
Moreover, assuming τ σ = ⊤, for each i ∈ I, the formula τ i σ is given by τ
Now, assuming τ σ = ⊤, let i ∈ I, and define
If the order of σ is 0 then σ is already an L -sentence, so we define T σ = {σ} in this case. Define
Let B ∈ B ′ , and let σ ∈ Σ + have order K. Then we can interpret the additional symbols of
, and, assuming that τ σ = ⊤ and given i ∈ I, we also have
and so a routine argument reveals that B |= σ. There is nothing to do for the case where σ has order 0, and so it follows that B ′ ⊆ B. Conversely, if B ∈ B then we can make B into an L ′ -structure by interpreting the new relations as follows. If R is one such new relation, then it is associated with a unary predicate symbol C appearing in some separation rule
Let b 1 , . . . , b N ∈ B and suppose B |= µ( b N ). Then there is an associated instantiation of C in B which we denote C bN . Now, define the interpretation of R in B using
Then another routine argument reveals that B |= T , and thus B ⊆ B ′ . So B = B ′ , and B is pseudoelementary relative to A as required.
If B is r.e./basic as a separation subclass of A, then that B is r.e./basic pseudoelementary relative to A follows immediately from the construction of L ′ and T . Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 2.10 and the definition of separation classes (Definition 2.5).
Converses to Lemma 2.10 and Corollary 2.11 do not hold in general. To see this, note that we shall show that separation classes are elementary (Theorem 2.15), while pseudoelementary classes may not be.
The following lemma is a mild generalization of the well known fact that pseudoelementary classes are closed under ultraproducts.
Lemma 2.12. If A is closed under ultraproducts and B is pseudoelementary relative to A, then B is closed under ultraproducts.
Proof. Suppose T is an L ′ -theory making B pseudoelementary relative to A. Let I be an indexing set and for each i ∈ I let B i ∈ B. Let U B i be an ultraproduct. For every i we can define an L ′ structure on B i , which we denote [31] , and as U B i ∈ A it follows that U B i ∈ B.
The aim now is to show that separation subclasses of elementary classes are elementary. As they are certainly closed under isomorphisms, in view of Lemmas 2.10 and 2.12 it will be sufficient to prove they are closed under taking elementary substructures. This is done by the following pair of technical lemmas. Lemma 2.13. Let L be a first-order signature, let A be an L -structure and let B be an elementary substructure of A. Let a 1 , . . . , a N be elements of B, and let
, and use these sets to make
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on η, noting that if η is a pure Lformula, i.e. if it involves none of the additional predicates, then that A |= η( a N ) if and only if B |= η( a N ) follows immediately from the assumption that B is an elementary substructure of A. So the non-trivial base cases are the atomic formulas of form S i (t( a N )) where t is an L -term. But these cases are almost as trivial, and the result follows immediately from how we defined the interpretation of S i in B, and the fact that B is a substructure of A. The inductive step is also entirely routine.
Lemma 2.14. If B is a separation subclass of A and A is closed under taking elementary substructures, then B is also closed under taking elementary substructures.
Proof. Let B be a separation subclass of A, let Σ be a separation scheme defining B relative to A, and suppose A is closed under taking elementary substructures. Let B ∈ B, and let B ′ be an elementary substructure of B. Let σ ∈ Σ. We must show B ′ |= σ. If the order of σ is 0 then this is automatic, so suppose
where this is as in Definition 2.2. Let a 1 , . . . , a N ∈ B ′ , and suppose B ′ |= µ( a N ). Then, as B ′ is an elementary substructure of B we must have B |= µ( a N ), and thus
This is equivalent to saying that we can extend L with new unary predicate symbols C 1 , . . . , C K to a signature L + , and make B into an L + -structure in such a way
) when this is treated as an L + -sentence in the obvious way. We treat B ′ as an L + structure by interpreting the new predicates as the restrictions of their interpretations in B. We aim to use Lemma 2. 13 .
First of all, we have B ′ |= η( a N ) by immediate application of Lemma 2.13. Now,
is an elementary substructure of B, we also have B |= γ i ( b Mi ), and thus B |= ψ i ( b Mi ), and so, again by Lemma 2.13, we have
as required. This is true for all i ∈ I, and the case where τ = ⊤ in the definition of σ is trivial, and so B ′ |= σ for all σ ∈ Σ, and the proof is complete.
Theorem 2.15. If A is elementary and B is a separation subclass of A then B is also elementary.
Proof. B is closed under ultraproducts, by Lemmas 2.10 and 2.12, and is also closed under elementary substructures, by Lemma 2.14. Since it is clearly also closed under taking isomorphisms the result follows from the Keisler-Shelah theorem.
Theorem 2.15 is not constructive, but we will later exploit the fact that we know that separation subclasses of elementary classes can be axiomatized to produce explicit axiomatizations.
The separation game
We will define games played between two players, Abelard (∀) and Eloise (∃). A game is played over a fixed L -structure in rounds numbered by the naturals starting with zero. In each round, ∀ plays first, then ∃ must respond. If a player has no legal move to make when required to play, then that player loses the game immediately, and the game does not continue. If one player loses, then the other player necessarily wins. We say that ∀ has an r-strategy if he can play in a way that guarantees he wins no later than round r. We say ∃ has an r-strategy if she can play in a way that guarantees that ∀ will not win till at least the (r + 1)th round, either by not losing, or by winning herself prior to that point. We say that ∃ has an ω-strategy if she can play in such a way that she can either win or survive indefinitely, however ∀ plays.
We now define the rules of our games more precisely. Let L be a first-order signature, and let A be a class of L -structures. Let Σ be a separation scheme for L , and let
+ (recall that Σ + is the subset of Σ containing the separation rules of positive order). Let A ∈ A, and for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K} let S k ,S k ⊆ A. We define the (A, σ)-game with starting position (S 1 , . . . , S K ,S 1 , . . . ,S K ). The idea is that, for all k, S k will contain elements definitely specified by the monadic predicate C k , andS k will denote a set of elements that are definitely in its complement. Over the course of the game ∃ is forced to decide whether elements of A are, or are not, contained in S k . Note thatS k will usually be a strict subset of the complement of S k , as there may be elements that ∃ is not forced to make a decision about at any point in the game. If ∃ cannot make a move that does not violate the conditions defined by σ then she loses the game. Formally, the game is played as follows:
• In round 0, ∀ chooses a 1 , . . . , a N such that A |= µ( a N ). In response, ∃ must decide, for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N } and k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, whether a n ∈ S k . If yes then a n is added to S k . If no then a n is added toS k . ∃ must choose in such a way that:
, where η is treated as a formula for signature
and C k is interpreted as S k for all k (where S k includes any elements newly added by ∃).
• In round r for r > 0, ∀ must play a move of form (τ i , b M ), where
is one of the C K -selectors of which τ is a conjunction, and
∃ must respond by deciding, for each m ∈ {1, . . . , M } and k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, whether b m ∈ S k . If yes then b m is added to S k , and if no then b m is added toS k . ∃ must choose in such a way that:
, where ψ is treated as an L + -formula, and C k is interpreted as S k for all k (where S k includes new elements added by ∃).
We sometimes refer to the (A, σ)-game with starting position S k =S k = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} as the simple (A, σ)-game. Note that these games are only defined for the cases where σ has positive order, as the order zero case is already just a first-order axiom, and we don't need to do anything more. Proof. If A ∈ B then A |= σ, so, given a N with A |= µ( a N ), there are monadic predicates C 1 , . . . , C K such that A |= η( a N ) ∧ τ . In this case ∃ can guarantee to never lose by assigning an element b ∈ A to S k if A |= C k (b), and toS k otherwise, whenever she is forced to make a choice. For the converse, suppose that A is countable, and that ∃ has an ω-strategy for the simple (A, σ)-game for every σ ∈ Σ + . Let
Since Σ and A are both countable, we can order the moves (τ i , b M ) that ∀ could potentially make using the natural numbers. Suppose ∀ plays according to the strategy whereby in the first round he plays a N , and in every subsequent round he plays the lowest ranked legal move that he has not yet played.
Consider the sets S k for k ∈ {1, . . . , K} constructed by ∃ as she follows her ω-strategy against ∀. By the rules governing the first round of play, and the assumption that ∃ is playing according to an ω-strategy, we must have
It follows that there must be
But this corresponds to a legal move by ∀, so he must have played it at some point, as his strategy implies that he eventually plays every move that becomes available after the first round. Thus we must have A |= ψ( b M ) when C k is interpreted as S k after all, as ∃ is following an ω-strategy. This would be a contradiction. Thus we must have A |= ∃ C K (η( a N )∧τ ). Since this is true for every choice of a N such that A |= µ( a N ), we have A |= σ, and since this argument holds for all σ ∈ Σ + , and we have assumed that A |= σ for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σ + , it follows that A ∈ B as required.
Note that round 0 is conceptually distinct from the subsequent rounds. We define the reduced (A, σ)-game with starting position (S 1 , . . . , S K ,S 1 , . . . ,S K ) to be the (A, σ)-game with the same starting position, but omitting round 0. For convenience we keep the same labeling for rounds as in the normal game, so the reduced game starts with round 1, not round 0. The concept of an r-strategy for r ≥ 1 carries over without modification for both players.
Generating recursive axiomatizations
The next step is to find a set of first-order axioms equivalent to ∃ having an ω-strategy in every simple (A, σ)-game such that σ ∈ Σ + . We must assume that Σ is at least recursively enumerable for the main result (Theorem 4.5) to hold, so we will assume for convenience that Σ is countable. We assume also that for every σ ∈ Σ + the associated conjunction τ is of form i∈ω τ i . This is something of an abuse of notation, as τ may be a conjunction of only finitely many formulas, but we will, without loss of generality, assume we've 'padded' τ out with an infinite number of closure rules whose γ part is unsatisfiable, and thus that do not affect the validity of the formula. We could avoid this 'padding' assumption by dividing several of the definitions and proofs to come into 'finite' and 'infinite' cases, but we trust instead that the necessary alterations for the finite case will become clear once the infinite case is understood. We could avoid the assumption of the countability of Σ altogether in many of the results, but this would make the notation more complex, and as the result we're really interested in requires recursive enumerability, this seems like unnecessary effort.
Writing down these axioms will involve some quite intricate notational constructions, and we will benefit greatly later from taking the time now to prove some technical results. Note that, if v is a valuation in the model theoretic sense, we will often abuse notation by writing e.g. v[ x N ] to stand for {v(x 1 ), . . . , v(x N )}. Similarly, if Z is a tuple of variables we will use v[Z] to denote {v(z) : z ∈ Z}. 
where v is an assignment of variables, and A is treated as an
Proof. We use induction on the construction of ψ. If ψ is an atomic formula, then either:
(1) ψ( y) = R(t 1 ( y), . . . , t N ( y)), where R is some N -ary relation symbol from L and t n is an L -term for all n ∈ {1. . . . , N }, (2) ψ( y) = t 1 ( y) ≈ t 2 ( y) where t 1 and t 2 are L -terms, or (3) ψ( y) = C k (t( y)), where t is an L -term and k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Note that given any L + -formula φ( y) with free variables y we can extend it in a truth-preserving manner to an L + -formula with free variables y ∪ 2K Z k by conjoining it with the L -formula
In the first two cases, the interpretation of the additional predicates of L + isn't relevant, so we can define
In the third case define
For the inductive step, consider first ¬ψ such that ψ (Z1,...,Z2K ) is known to exist for ψ. In this case we can just use ¬ψ (Z1,...,Z2K ) , as
Since ψ is quantifier-free, we are done.
There is some redundancy in the formulas constructed by the proof of Lemma 4.1. For example, T may appear multiple times, but we're not concerned with computational efficiency or style here so it doesn't matter.
In what follows, we will need to take formulas whose free variables are naturally partitioned into sets, and define new ones with additional variables distributed among these sets. The next definition sets up a notation for this 'adding of new variables to sets'. 
f (x)(k) = 0}, for k ∈ {K + 1, . . . , 2K}. The way we should understand Definition 4.2 is that the function ∆ K takes each x ∈ x and adds it to either Z k or Z K+k , for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, as directed by the function f .
We now define L -formulas as follows, noting the assumptions made about Σ stated at the start of this section.
• For each 1 ≤ K < ω, and for each (Z 1 , . . . , Z 2K ) such that Z k is a tuple of variables for all k ∈ {1, . . . , 2K}, define
to be a quantifier-free L -formula with free variables
• For each 1 ≤ K < ω, for each i ∈ ω, for each σ ∈ Σ + , and for each (Z 1 , . . . , Z 2K ), define
each i ∈ ω, for each 1 ≤ r < ω, and for each (Z 1 , . . . , Z 2K ), recursively define
where ψ j ∆K (Z1,...,Z2K ,f ) is constructed from ψ j as in Lemma 4.1. What these formulas are intended to capture is the idea that ∃ can respond to all moves involving τ j for j ≤ i played by ∀ at a particular stage in the game, and moreover can do so in such a way that she will continue to be able to do so for at least r rounds. This will be made precise in Lemma 4.3. Note that although it is not apparent from the notation, we are assuming that every new occurrence of y in the construction of these formulas involves only fresh variable symbols. If we allow variable symbols to be repeated then it turns out we do not properly capture the concept of 'adding elements to Z k ', which is what the ∆ operation is supposed to be for. This is explained in the proof of the following lemma. 
where ∀ can only play moves involving τ j when j ≤ i.
Proof. We use induction on r. For the base case (r = 1), let i ∈ ω and suppose first that A, v |= α σ (Z1,...,Z2K )1i . Let v ′ be an assignment agreeing with v about everything except, possibly, y, and suppose A, v ..,Z2K ,f ) . So (2) =⇒ (1). For the inductive step, let 1 < R < ω and suppose the claim is true for all 1 ≤ r < R. Then, by the inductive hypothesis, and appealing to similar reasoning as used for the base case, A, v |= α σ (Z1,...,Z2K )Ri if and only if, whatever move involving τ j for j ≤ i ∀ plays, ∃ can respond in such a way that she has an (R − 1)-strategy in the game whose starting position corresponds to her response. But this is the same as saying that ∃ has an R-strategy as claimed.
• Now, returning to our defining of formulas, let σ ∈ Σ + , and for all i ∈ ω, for all (Z 1 , . . . , Z 2K ), and for all 0 ≤ r < ω, define
using recursion. Again, we assume that the variables in x do not appear in any Z k , and that every time new universally quantified variables are introduced via the defining recursion we use fresh symbols.
Lemma 4.4. Let 1 ≤ K < ω, let A ∈ A, let B be a separation subclass of A defined by the separation scheme Σ, and let σ ∈ Σ be a separation rule of order K. Then for all (Z 1 , . . . , Z 2K ), for all assignments v, for all i ∈ I, and for all r ∈ ω, the following are equivalent:
∃ has an r-strategy in the (A, σ)-game with starting position
Proof. (1) amounts to the statement that whenever v
′ is an assignment agreeing with v about everything except, possibly, x, if A, v ′ |= µ( x) then there is a way ∃ can assign the variables of where ∀ can only play moves involving τ j when j ≤ i, and, moreover, she can do so in such a way that she can then guarantee to survive at least r rounds of the resulting reduced game. But this is of course equivalent to saying she has an r-strategy as claimed.
• Finally, for all σ ∈ Σ, for all i ∈ ω and for all r ∈ ω, definê
Here we assume we've made a sensible choice for the way new variable symbols are introduced while recursively building theβ σ ri formulas for increasingly large values of i and r. In particular we want the set of formulas produced to be recursively enumerable.
The following theorem is a considerable generalization of [23, Theorem 4.5] and [15, Theorem 5.6]. Nevertheless, the key ingredients of the proofs are essentially the same. 
Proof. If
+ , we can use the predicates C k for k ∈ {1, . . . , K} to guide the strategy of ∃ in the appropriate games. By Proposition 3.1, ∃ has an ω-strategy in every simple (A, σ)-game for σ ∈ Σ + , and thus A |= β σ (∅,...,∅)ri for all σ ∈ Σ + and for all r, i ∈ ω, by Lemma 4.4.
If σ ∈ Σ \ Σ + then σ =β σ ri , and so it follows immediately that A |=β σ ri for all σ, r, i. Conversely, suppose first that A is countable and that A / ∈ B. Then, either A |= σ for some σ ∈ Σ \ Σ + , or, by Proposition 3.1, there is σ ∈ Σ + such that ∃ does not have an ω-strategy in the simple (A, σ)-game. In the former case we immediately have A |=β σ ri , just by definition ofβ σ ri , so we consider the latter. It follows from König's Tree Lemma [29] that some game tree for the simple (A, σ)-game is finite (otherwise ∃ would have a strategy defined using an infinite branch). There are only a finite number of ∀ moves in this game tree, and so, if i ∈ ω is the largest index of a τ i used in a move by ∀ in this tree, we have A |=β σ ri for some r ∈ ω, by Lemma 4.4. Now, suppose A is uncountable, and suppose also that A |=β σ ri for all σ ∈ Σ and for all r, i ∈ ω. Proof. Since Σ is r.e. the set T = {β σ ri : σ ∈ Σ, r, i ∈ ω} is too. By Theorem 4.5 we know T axiomatizes B relative to A, and by Craig's trick, any class with an r.e. axiomatization relative to a superclass also has a recursive axiomatization relative to that superclass (see, for example, [24, Exercise 6.3.1] ). Now, let σ ∈ Σ + , letβ σ ri ∈ T be one of the generated L -sentences axiomatizing B relative to A, and supposeβ σ ri is not logically equivalent to a universal L -sentence. Then, in particular the prenex normal form ofβ σ ri contains an existential quantifier. Note that µ is the antecedent of an implication, so if the prenex normal form of µ contains no universal quantifiers, then this implies there must be some α for some f . By induction, this latter event can only occur if there is j ≤ i such that the prenex normal form of γ j contains a universal quantifier. This proves the claim, because it follows that provided the conditions are met, we can obtain a universal axiomatization by putting every formulaβ σ ri into prenex normal form. Note that, by inspection of the proof of Lemma 2.7, if B has a universal axiomatization T relative to A, the condition on the lack of universal quantifiers in certain places from Corollary 4.6 holds for the derived separation rules σ φ for φ ∈ T . Thus the second part of Corollary 4.6 has a kind of converse. The following lemma articulates an essentially trivial but useful observation. 
the prenex normal form of µ contains no universal quantifiers, and, in addition, for every conjunct
τ i = ∀ y(γ i ( y) → ψ i ( y M )) of τ ,
.8. Returning to Example 2.6, by Corollary 4.6 we see that the class of representable posets has a recursive axiomatization (as was proved in [15]). However, the universal quantifiers in the j and m formulas mean that the axiomatization produced is not universal. Indeed, the class of representable posets has no universal axiomatization, as it is not closed under substructures (see [15, Corollary 2.9]).
We also note the following alternative approach to constructing a recursive axiomatization for B relative to A when B is an r.e. separation subclass of A and A is elementary. [22, Chapter 9] provides a method for generating a recursive first-order axiomatization for the elementary closure of any pseudoelementary class whose defining theory in the extended language is recursive. Since in the situation we are describing B is elementary (by Theorem 2.15), the elementary closure is just the class itself, and, since we have an axiomatization of B as a recursive pseudoelementary class by Lemma 2.10, this method can be applied to find a recursive axiomatization for B. This method also produces a universal axiomatization when B is pseudouniversal, in the sense of [22, Definition 9.1] .
Also of interest is the result presented as [22, Theorem 9.14], where it is attributed to Mal'cev and Tarski. According to this theorem, every pseudoelementary class that is closed under ultraroots is elementary, and, moreover, if it is also closed under substructures it is universal. If the pseudoelementary theory is r.e. then so too will be the elementary, or universal, axiomatizations. Appropriate sets of axioms are defined, but not made explicit. The reader is directed to the discussion following [22, Corollary 9.15] for some comments on this.
A notable advantage of the recursive axiomatization generated in the proof of Theorem 4.5 is that, as it has an explicit connection to ∃'s ability to survive in certain combinatorial games, it can give us some insight into the question of whether an r.e. separation subclass B of an elementary class A is finitely axiomatizable relative to A. To understand how this works, let T = {ψ 0 , ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . .} be the recursive axiomatization obtained from Theorem 4.5. Then, if B is finitely axiomatizable relative to A, there must be some K ∈ ω with A |= K k=0 ψ k =⇒ A |= ψ j for all j ∈ ω, for all A ∈ A. So, to prove that no such finite axiomatization exists, it suffices to construct, for each K ∈ ω, a structure
Translating this back into the setting of games, for a basic separation subclass the idea is to construct objects A r ∈ A such that ∃ has r-strategies for all simple (A, σ)-games, but not an (r + 1)-strategy for at least one such game. The non-basic case is similar, but we must consider the maximum indices of allowed ∀ moves, and we also have to take the separation rules of order zero into account. Of course, the meat of any such proof is to be found in the constructions themselves, but this can be a useful approach, where it applies. For example, this method is essentially the engine of the proofs of the titular result of [14] , and the results of [23, section 5] , though the work in these examples is phrased in terms of ultraproducts. Note that the argument as described here has an advantage over the originals as reasoning about properties of the ultraproduct is not required. We present a simple application of this technique in Section 6.2.
Expressive power and decision problems
To begin this section we organize our results on the expressive power of the formalism of separation subclasses vis-à-vis first-order logic. Proof. We have shown that the class of (α, β)-representable posets is a basic separation subclass of the class of posets whenever 2 ≤ α, β < ω, and this class is also known to not be finitely axiomatizable for α, β ≥ 3 [14] . Proof. The horizontal arrows come straight from the definitions, and the lack of backward arrows is also straightforward. The downward arrows come from Corollary 4.6 and Theorem 2.15, and the upward arrows come from Corollary 2.8. The lack of an arrow from BS A to BE A comes from Lemma 5.1.
Then Figure 1 represents the class inclusions that always hold (with arrows from subclass to superclass). In cases where there is no arrow there are choices of A for which the inclusion does not hold.
Now we present some easy results on the decision problem for separation subclasses. Proof. If A is elementary then B has a recursive axiomatization relative to A, by Corollary 4.6, and the result follows immediately.
Suppose now that A is not elementary, and that B is defined by the r.e. separation scheme Σ. If A ∈ A is finite, then Proposition 3.1 says that, provided A |= σ for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σ + , we have A ∈ B ⇐⇒ ∃ has an ω-strategy for every simple (A, σ)-game with σ ∈ Σ + . By König's Tree Lemma, if a game tree for a particular starting position is infinite then it has an infinite branch, and in this case ∃ can play forever. So, roughly speaking, ∃ does not have an ω-strategy if and only if there is a finite game tree for some σ ∈ Σ + . The idea is to use dovetailing to check through all possible game trees for all possible simple (A, σ)-games for σ ∈ Σ + , and concurrently check whether A |= σ for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σ + . If there is a finite game tree or an invalid formula it will eventually be found. Proof. By Lemma 2.10, a basic separation subclass is basic pseudoelementary relative to the superclass, and being basic pseudoelementary is equivalent to being finitely axiomatizable in existential second-order logic. Finally, by Fagin's Theorem [18] , the problem of checking whether a finite structure satisfies an existential second-order sentence is in NP.
Proposition 5.6. Let A be an elementary class and make the following definitions in addition to those of Proposition 5.2:
P A is the class of subclasses of A whose decision problem relative to A is in P. NP A is the class of subclasses of A whose decision problem relative to A is in NP. Then Figure 2 represents the class inclusions that always hold, using the same system as in Figure 1 , but with the addition that the existence of a full arrow in either of the places indicated by dotted arrows is equivalent to P = NP.
Proof. The arrow from BS A to NP A comes from Lemma 5.5. To see that there is no arrow from P A to BS A let A be, for example, the class of all sets, and let B be the class of all finite sets. Then the decision problem for B relative to A Figure 2 . Complexity class inclusions is trivially in P (as every instance is a yes instance), but finiteness has no firstorder characterization, and thus cannot be formalized as a separation subclass (by Theorem 2.15). That there is no arrow from NP A to BS A follows immediately.
If there is an arrow from BS A to P A then, for example, deciding whether a finite poset is (4, 4)-representable is in P, as the (4, 4)-representable posets are a basic separation subclass of the class of posets (see Example 2.6), and thus P = NP, as this problem is NP-complete [38] . Conversely, if P = NP then there is an arrow from NP A to P A , and thus an arrow from BS A to P A .
We have established that every basic separation subclass of an elementary class is recursively axiomatizable relative to the superclass, and also that the converse does not hold in general (see Proposition 5.2). The following result says that the converse still doesn't hold when we restrict to varieties and recursively enumerable subvarieties.
Proposition 5.7. There is a finitely axiomatized variety A, and a recursively axiomatized subvariety B of A such that B is not a basic separation subclass of A.
Proof. The class RRA of representable relation algebras is a variety (by [36] , or see [22, Theorem 3.37] ), and can indeed be recursively axiomatized by equations (see [22, Theorem 8.4] ), but the decision problem for RRA relative to the class of relation algebras, RA, is not decidable (by [21] , or see [22, Theorem 18.13] ), and thus cannot be a basic separation subclass (appealing to Lemma 5.5).
Finally, as in the argument used in the proof of Lemma 5.5, a basic separation subclass B of a basic elementary class A can be finitely axiomatized in existential second-order logic. Of course, it follows immediately from Fagin's Theorem and Proposition 5.6 that there are subclasses that are finitely axiomatizable in existential second-order logic relative to their superclasses that cannot be expressed as basic separation subclasses.
Applications
In this section we use the general theory of separation subclasses to get some axiomatization results in graph theory and theoretical computer science.
6.1. Disjoint union partial algebras. Here we deal with a class of structures introduced in [23] . Definition 6.1. A partial algebra is a set equipped with a number of partial operations of fixed arities, and also possibly some constants. In order to accommodate this in first-order logic we think of partial algebras as relational structures, where each n-ary partial operation corresponds to an (n + 1)-ary relation, and for each such relation R we have a sentence ∀x 1 . . . x n yz (R(x 1 , . . . , x n , y) ∧ R(x 1 , . . . , x n , z)) → y ≈ z expressing that the associated partial function is well defined. Definition 6.2. A disjoint union partial algebra (DUPA) is a partial algebra with a single ternary relation d (disjoint union). We can also add a constant element 0, but including 0 can be shown not to influence the property we discuss here, so we omit it (see [23, Remark 2.10] ). We will usually write d(x, y, z) as x∪y = z.
For more on disjoint union partial algebras and their uses computer science see [23] . (1) a∪b ∈ Γ =⇒ either a ∈ Γ or b ∈ Γ.
(2) If either a ∈ Γ or b ∈ Γ, and if a∪b is defined, then a∪b ∈ Γ. (3) If both a ∈ Γ and b ∈ Γ then a∪b is not defined.
Note that the motivation for using the word 'basic' here is different from that in Definition 2.5. There it is used because of its consonance with the notion of a basic elementary class, while here it is used in the sense of being a member of a base, in this case the base of a representation. Proof. Let L = {d} be the signature of disjoint union partial algebras, and let L + = L ∪ {C}, where C is a unary predicate symbol. Define the following L + -sentences:
Then τ = τ 0 ∧ τ 1 ∧ τ 2 states that the set defined by C is basic, and, moreover, τ is a closure rule as defined in Definition 2.1. Now define
and Proof. This follows from Proposition 6.6 and Theorem 4.5.
Note that the appearance of ¬∃ in σ 2 means the recursive axiomatization generated is not universal. Indeed, by [23, Corollary 3.3] we know that no such universal axiomatization can exist.
Corollary 6.9. The decision problem for the class of representable DUPAs is in NP.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 5.5.
N -colourable graphs.
Here and elsewhere we assume all graphs are undirected and simple. Given ≤ N < ω, a graph G = (V, E) is N -colourable if it is possible to assign to each vertex v ∈ V one of N colours in such a way that no adjacent vertices have the same colour. Equivalently, G is N -colourable if there is a homomorphism h : G → K N where K N is the complete graph with N vertices. Let G be the (elementary) class of all graphs, and, given 1 ≤ N < ω, define G N to be the class of N -colourable graphs. Note that if G is N -colourable via h : G → K N , and if H is any other graph, then the composition of h with the projection function, h • π G : G × H → K N , is a homomorphism. So, in particular, G N is closed under taking direct products for all 1 ≤ N < ω.
Let L = {E} be the standard signature for graphs (so E stands for the binary edge relation). Let L + = L ∪ {C 1 , . . . , C N }, and define
Then σ is a separation rule, and if C N is the separation subclass of G defined by {σ}, then C N is exactly the class of all N -colourable graphs. Thus we see that C N has the various pleasant properties associated with basic separation subclasses of elementary classes. In particular, from Corollary 4.6 we obtain a recursive universal axiomatization for C N as a class of L -structures. This is not a new result. Indeed, [40, Theorem 1.4] proves that C N has a recursive axiomatization using universal Horn formulas, and that paper attributes to W. Taylor a proof of the same result using the De Bruijn-Erdős theorem for graphs (i.e. that a graph is N -colourable when all its finite subgraphs are) [10] . Now, being universal, C N is closed under isomorphisms, substructures and ultraproducts, and, as the class is also closed under taking direct products, it follows that C N is a universal Horn class (see e.g. [5, Theorem V.2.23]). The universal Horn theory of C N must be precisely the universal Horn consequences of our recursive axiomatization, and so is also a recursively enumerable set, and consequently defines a recursive axiomatization using Craig's trick. Thus the prima facie stronger result of [40] follows easily from our version, which we got more or less for free from the general theory. Note that such a universal Horn axiomatization is essentially the best that can be hoped for, as for N ≥ 2 there can be no finite axiomatization of C N [40, Theorem 1.5]. Of course, C 1 is just the class of totally disconnected (edgeless) graphs.
Making good on the claims in the comments at the end of Section 4, we can also use our game-generated axioms to find a simple proof that C N is not finitely axiomatizable when N ≥ 2. First, for each n ≥ 1 consider the cycle graph C 2n+1 , and consider also the class C 2 as a separation subclass of G. Then the number of rounds ∃ can guarantee to survive in the simple (C 2n+1 , σ) game scales linearly with log 2 n. Here ∃'s strategy is to always colour vertices consistently with their closest neighbour, and ∀'s strategy is make the maximum size of a chain of uncoloured vertices as small as possible each round -see Figure 3 for an illustration. Now, if C 2 were finitely axiomatizable then a graph would be 2-colourable if and only if ∃ could guarantee survival for a fixed finite number of rounds. By choosing n large enough, ∃ can find a graph C 2n+1 where she does have such a strategy, but which is nevertheless not 2-colourable, and this would result in contradiction. Thus the axiomatization of C 2 generated by Corollary 4.6 cannot be logically equivalent to a finite subset of itself, and it follows that C 2 is not finitely axiomatizable. Note that as C 2n+1 ∈ C 3 for all n, this argument also shows that C 2 is not finitely axiomatizable relative to C 3 .
Generalizing, let N > 2, and for each n ≥ 1 define G n to be the graph obtained by taking the disjoint union of the cycle graph C 2n+1 and the complete graph K N −2 , and adding edges between every vertex of C 2n+1 and every vertex of K N −2 . Then, in the game where ∃ attempts to colour G n using N colours, the choice of colours for K N −2 forces her to attempt to colour C 2n+1 with two colours. We know this is impossible, but the number of rounds she can survive again scales with log 2 n. Here ∃'s strategy is to choose N − 2 colours for K N −2 , and to use her strategy from the N = 2 case for C 2n+1 with the two remaining colours. Thus C N is not finitely axiomatizable for all N ≥ 2. This provides a proof of [40, Theorem 1.5] that does not use the fact that the class of graphs with chromatic number N is not elementary for all N ≥ 3 [37, Theorem 6.3] . Note that, combined with the result for N = 2, this argument also shows that C N is not finitely axiomatizable relative to C N +1 for all N ≥ 2.
Moreover, let N ≥ 3 and define χ N to be the class of graphs with chromatic number N . We can use our results on the lack of a finite axiomatization for Figure 3 . A game played on C 5 , with different 'colours' being denoted by ⋄ and •. Here ∀ first asks ∃ to colour the top vertex, which she does with ⋄ (both players making arbitrary choices here).
To minimize the maximum length of a chain of uncoloured elements ∀ then demands that one of the bottom two vertices be coloured (the left one say). To be consistent with the closest coloured vertex ∃ responds by colouring with ⋄. Now ∀ demands that either of the vertices between the two coloured ones (moving clockwise) be coloured (the higher one, say). To be consistent with the nearest neighbour ∃ must colour it with •. Now ∀ can force a forbidden colouring in the next round, and win the game in the round after that.
relative to C N to prove that χ N is not elementary. To see this, first note that χ N = C N \ C N −1 , and so C N = C N −1 ∪ χ N , which is a disjoint union. Now, as C N and C N −1 are elementary, if χ N is also elementary then C N −1 will be finitely axiomatizable relative to C N , by a variation of the compactness argument that says that if a class and its complement are elementary then both will be basic elementary. As C N −1 is not finitely axiomatizable relative to C N , it follows that χ N is not elementary. Thus we also obtain an alternative proof of [37, Theorem 6.3] (the original uses Erdős' famous result that for all m, k ∈ ω there is a finite graph with chromatic number ≥ m and no circuits of length ≤ k [17] ). As a final observation, every first-order structure can be embedded into an ultraproduct of its finitely generated substructures (see e.g. [5, Theorem V.2.14]). Moreover, if a graph G has the property that every finite subgraph is N -colourable, then, as C N is elementary, an ultraproduct of these subgraphs must also be Ncolourable, by Loś' theorem. Furthermore, as C N is universal, its substructures must also be in C N , and so it follows that G ∈ C N . Thus, from the axiomatization of C N we also obtain a rather indirect proof of the De Bruijn-Erdős theorem. We must note that much simpler proofs are well known, so this last result is essentially a curiosity.
6.3. Clique covers. Let N ∈ ω. We say a graph G = (V, E) has an N -clique cover if its vertices can be partitioned into N subsets, each of which is clique. In other words, if there is a partition V 1 , . . . , V N of V such that the restriction of E to V n produces a complete graph for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Note that a graph G has an N -clique covering if and only if the complement graphḠ = (V,Ē) is N -colourable. As we can defineĒ as ¬E, the results of Section 6.2 apply here, with the following exception. The class of undirected simple graphs with an N -clique cover is not closed under taking direct products for any N . To see this, consider the product of the totally disconnected graph with N vertices with itself. So this class does not have a universal Horn axiomatization (by [5, Theorem V.2.23] again), though it does have a recursive universal axiomatization. 6.4. Harmonious colourings. The concept of a harmonious colouring for a graph was introduced in [19] and defined in its current form in [25] . Given N ∈ ω, we say a graph has a harmonious N -colouring if it has an N -colouring in which each pair of colours can be used to colour a pair of adjacent vertices at most once. Define L + , τ 0 , τ 1 and τ 2 as in Section 6.2. In addition, define τ 3 = ∀y 1 y 2 y 3 y 4 ¬((y 1 ≈ y 3 ) ∧ (y 2 ≈ y 4 )) ∧ E(y 1 , y 2 ) ∧ E(y 3 , y 4 )
¬ C m (y 1 ) ∧ C n (y 2 ) ∧ C m (y 3 ) ∧ C n (y 4 ) , then define σ = ∀x ⊤ → ∃C 1 . . . C n ⊤ ∧ τ 0 ∧ τ 1 ∧ τ 2 ∧ τ 3 .
Then σ defines the class of graphs with harmonious N -colourings as a basic separation subclass of G. It again follows from Corollary 4.6 that this class has a universal recursive axiomatization. Note that when N ≥ 2 the class is not closed under taking direct products. To see this, consider the product of the complete graphs K N and K 2 . Each component has a harmonious N -colouring, but the product does not, simply because it has too many edges. So the class does not have a universal Horn axiomatization. When N = 1 the graphs must be totally disconnected just to have an N -colouring, which will be trivially harmonious. We note that the axiomatization produced here is equivalent to a finite one, as a graph with a harmonious N -colouring can have at most N 2 edges, as this is the maximum number of distinct colour pairs. Thus, assuming ∀ plays in an efficient way, in other words, that he forces ∃ to define a new coloured pair each round if possible, he will either definitely be able to force a win in round ( N 2 + 2) at the latest, or he will have run out of useful moves in an earlier round. So, if ∃ has an ( N 2 + 2)-strategy then she has an ω-strategy. Appealing to Lemma 4.7 proves the claim.
Note that it is proved in [25] that the problem of deciding, when given a graph G and a positive integer N , whether G has a harmonious colouring with N -colours is NP-complete. As it is known that checking whether a first-order sentence is valid in a finite structure can be done in polynomial time (see [39, Proposition 3 .1]), we may wonder whether we have accidentally proved P = NP. The answer, sadly, is no, because given (G, N ) we have to construct the appropriate sentence before we can check it, and we have no reason to believe we can do this in polynomial time.
